Abstract-In key management schemes that realize secure multicast communications encrypted by group keys on a public network, tree structures are often used to update the group keys efficiently. Selçuk and Sidhu have proposed an efficient scheme which updates dynamically the tree structures based on the withdrawal probabilities of members. In this paper, it is shown that Selçuk-Sidhu scheme is asymptotically optimal for the cost of withdrawal. Furthermore, a new key management scheme, which takes account of key update costs of joining in addition to withdrawal, is proposed. It is proved that the proposed scheme is also asymptotically optimal, and it is shown by simulation that it can attain good performance for nonasymptotic cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the multicast communication of a group on a public network, a group secret key is often used to realize secure communication. But, when a member joins and/or withdraws from the group, a new group key must be redistributed.
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) scheme, which was independently proposed by Wallner-Harder-Agee [1] and WongGouda-Lam [2] in 1997, is a scheme with a tree structure that can renew the group key securely and efficiently when a member changes. Poovendran and Baras [3] analyzed the LKH scheme information-theoretically by considering the withdrawal probability of members in the scheme. Furthermore, Selçuk and Sidhu [4] have proposed a more efficient scheme such that a tree structure is dynamically updated based on the withdrawal probabilities of members. They analyzed the performance of their scheme information-theoretically. But, their evaluation is very loose.
In this paper, we derive an asymptotically tight upper bound of the key update cost in Selçuk-Sidhu scheme. More precisely, the key update cost is O(log n) when a group has n members, and our upper bound is tight within a constant factor which does not depend on n. Furthermore, we propose a new dynamical key management scheme, which takes account of key update costs for joining in addition to withdrawal. We show that the proposed scheme is also asymptotically optimal. Furthermore, in nonasymptotic cases, the proposed scheme is more efficient than Selçuk-Sidhu scheme for joining while it is almost as efficient as Selçuk-Sidhu scheme for withdrawal.
In this paper, we assume that channels are noiseless and public. Hence, any information sent over the channels may be wiretapped by adversaries who may be inside or outside of the group. Each member has a private key and several subgroup keys in addition to a group key. The subgroup key and group key are shared by the members of a subgroup and the group, respectively. The group key is used to encrypt secret messages to communicate among the group. On the other hand, the private key and subgroup keys are used when the keys must be updated by the change of members.
Furthermore, we suppose the following in this paper. A reliable server, who has all the keys in the group, updates and distributes new keys when a member changes. The number of members in the group is sufficiently large, and the frequency of joining and withdrawal is relatively large. The key update cost is evaluated by the number of keys that must be updated when a member changes. To keep the security of communication, the key management scheme needs to meet the so-called Forward Security and Backward Security, which are defined as follows.
• [Forward Security] A member who withdraws from a group cannot decrypt any data that will be sent in the group after the withdrawal.
• [Backward Security] A member who joins a group cannot decrypt the data that were sent in the group before the joining. In Section II, Selçuk-Sidhu scheme is reviewed, and the performance of the scheme is evaluated precisely in Section III. Furthermore, in Section IV, Selçuk-Sidhu scheme is extended to consider the cost of joining. Finally, some simulation results are shown in Section V.
II. SELÇ UK-SIDHU SCHEME
The LKH scheme [1] , [2] can be represented by a binary tree such that each member of a group corresponds to each leaf of the tree while the root, each internal node, and each leaf also correspond to the group key, a subgroup key, and a private key, respectively. Each member holds all the keys on the path from the root to the leaf of the member in the tree. Each internal node makes a subgroup which consists of the descendants of the node, and the subgroup can communicate securely against any other members not included in the subgroup by using the subgroup key. In the multicast communication of the group, the group key is used to realize secure communication. But, when a member joins or withdraws from the group, the subgroup keys and private keys are used to update the keys. Note that in order to keep security, it is necessary to update all the keys on the path from the root to the leaf of the member.
For the LKH scheme, Poovendran and Baras [3] introduced the withdrawal probabilities of members to analyze information-theoretically the average cost of key update in the case of the withdrawal. Let G be a group and let P M be the probability that a member M ∈ G withdraws from the group within a certain period 1 . P M is assumed to be given since it can be often estimated from the statistics and the personal data of the member. P M satisfies 0 < P M ≤ 1. But, note that
is usually not equal to one. Hence, we use the normalized withdrawal probability distribution P ≡ {P M /P G : M ∈ G} to evaluate the performance. When a member withdraws from the group, the average withdrawal cost L and the average normalized withdrawal cost l are defined by
respectively, where d M is the number of keys that must be updated when member M withdraws. We note that d M is equal to the depth of member M in the key tree of the LKH scheme.
In the case of lossless source coding, l given by (3) corresponds to the average code length for a fixed-to-variable length code (FV code) with probability distribution P and codeword length {d M : M ∈ G}, and it is well known that the Huffman tree [5] is the best tree to minimize the average code length under the prefix condition. Furthermore, if the group is incremented and the probability distribution changes as the coding progresses, the optimal code tree can be kept by the dynamic Huffman coding algorithm [6] [7] .
In the case of key management, the prefix condition is also required because the set of keys of each member must be different from that of others to keep security. Based on this observation, Poovendran and Baras have shown that in the case of key management, the Huffman tree is the best tree to minimize the average normalized withdrawal cost. However, if the key tree is updated by the dynamic Huffman coding algorithm to keep the key tree optimally, the key update cost cannot be minimized usually because the algorithm often changes the tree structure for many members besides a withdrawn member, and this causes additional key update costs. Hence, in the case of key management, it is better to keep the tree structure as unchanged as possible for nonwithdrawn members. Based on this idea, Selçuk and Sidhu [4] have proposed two key tree updating algorithms.
In order to explain the Selçuk-Sidhu algorithms, we first define an operation Insert(M, X), which represents the insertion of a new member M at node X, i.e. a new node N is inserted 1 In order to keep the system securely, all keys are usually renewed periodically. Hence, the period is finite and P M < 1 for many members. between X and its parent node Y as shown in Fig. 1 , and M is linked as a child of N . For node X, let P X be the weight that is given by the sum of the withdrawal probabilities of all members included in the descendants of node X 2 . Then, the first algorithm to update a key tree is described as follows.
Algorithm 1
Let M be a new member and let X be the root of a given key tree.
1. If X is a leaf, then operate Insert(M, X) and exit. 2. Let X l and X r be the left and right children of X, respectively. If it holds that P M ≥ P X l and P M ≥ P Xr , then operate Insert(M, X) and exit.
In order to describe the second algorithm, we first define the cost increase C M,X for a new member M and a node X as follows [4] .
which represents the increase of cost L for the case that a new member M is inserted at node X. Let C min be the minimum cost increase that is given by
Then, the second algorithm inserts a new member M at the node that can attain C min . Formally, the second algorithm to update a tree key is defined as follows.
Algorithm 2
Let M be a new member . 1) First calculate C M,X for every node X, and obtain C min . Let X min be a node that attains C min . 2) Operate Insert(M, X min ).
It is shown by simulation in [4] that Algorithm 2 can attain less average withdrawal cost L than Algorithm 1. But, although Algorithm 1 can be implemented with O(log n) time complexity when |G| = n, i.e. the size of a group is n, Algorithm 2 requires O(n) time complexity in the search of X min .
Selçuk and Sidhu evaluated the average normalized withdrawal cost l for the case of Algorithm 1 as follows 3 [4] .
where H(P) is the entropy of the probability distribution P = {P M /P G : M ∈ G}, and it is defined by
K 1 and K 2 are constants given by
where α = 1+ √ 5
2 . We note from the source coding theorem for FV codes [8] that the average normalized withdrawal cost l must satisfy
Furthermore, it holds from Theorem 1 shown below that H(P) = O(log n) for |G| = n. Hence, the upper bound of l given by (7) is not asymptotically tight as n becomes large. This result means that Algorithm 1 is not efficient or the upper bound is loose. In the next section, we will show that Algorithm 1 is asymptotically optimal by deriving an asymptotically tight upper bound.
Theorem 1
Assume that the maximum and minimum probabilities of withdrawal defined by
are fixed. Then, for n = |G|, H(P) defined by (8) satisfies
H(P) = O(log n). (14)
Proof: (Omitted)
III. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SELÇ UK-SIDHU SCHEME
In order to derive a tight upper bound for the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let X and S be sibling nodes each other in the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1. Then, it holds that
where P max is defined in (12).
Proof: (The lemma can be proved by mathematical induction. The details are omitted.)
Now, we evaluate the weight of the ancestors of an arbitrarily given node X in the key tree generated by Algorithm 3 In this paper, the base of log is 2.
1. Let nodes F and G be the parent and grandparent of X, respectively, and let U be the sibling of F . Then, we have from Lemma 1 that
Furthermore, we have that
where the first and second inequalities holds from Lemma 1 and (16). By repeating the same procedure, we obtain that
where d X is the depth of node X. Therefore, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2
In the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1, the following relation holds for any node X and any leaf M X that is a descendant of X.
where
M is the depth from node X to leaf M . Proof: (19) and (20) hold from (18) and (6), respectively.
Next, we evaluate P X .
Lemma 2
Let X l and X r be the children of node X. Assume that the weight of X is larger than a real number t but the weight of X l is not larger than t, i.e. P X > t ≥ P X l . Then, the following inequalities hold.
Proof: From (15), we obtain that
Let t(> P max ) be a parameter which will be optimized later. Now, for a given leaf M , we consider the node X that is the nearest ancestor of M under the condition P X > t. Then, from (19), (20), and (22), the depth d M of leaf M can be bounded as follows.
We can easily show for f (t) = − log(t − P max ) + K 1 log(2t + P max ) that f (t) can be minimized at t = t m given by
2 . Note that if a key tree is sufficient large and efficiently constructed, there exists the node X that satisfies P X > t m > P max . Hence, by using this t m we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3
When the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1 is sufficiently large, the depth d M of a leaf M in the key tree is upper bounded as follows.
where K 3 is defined by
By averaging d M for all member in G, the following theorem holds for the average normalized withdrawal cost l.
Theorem 4
When a key tree constructed by Algorithm 1 is sufficiently large, the average normalized withdrawal cost l of the key tree satisfies that
Proof: l can be evaluated as follows.
where equality (a) and inequality (b) hold from (8) and the following lemma, respectively.
Lemma 3 H(P), P G , and P min satisfy that
Proof: It is well known that the entropy H(P) is bounded by log n for n = |G|, and it holds obviously that P G ≥ nP min . Hence, we obtain that
We finaly note that in (27), the coefficient of H(P) = O(log n) is one and the second and third terms are constants. Hence, Theorem 4 gives an asymptotically tight bound of l.
IV. EXTENSION OF SELÇ UK-SIDHU SCHEME
In Selçuk-Sidhu scheme [4] , only the withdrawal cost of a new member is considered. But, the withdrawal cost is an expected cost in the future, which may not be occur. On the other hand, it is always necessary to update a key tree when a new member joins. Hence, in this section, we propose extended schemes of Algorithms 1 and 2 to consider the joining cost in addition to the withdrawal cost.
When a new member is inserted at the node X with depth d X , the withdrawal cost L increases by C M,X , which is given by (4) . But, at the same time, d X + 1 keys in the tree must be updated with probability one for the joining. Hence, the cost increase including the joining cost, say C * M,X , can be given by C 2) Let X l and X r be the left and right children of X, respectively. If it holds that P M +1 ≥ P X l and P M +1 ≥ P Xr , then operate Insert(M, X) and exit. 3) If P X l ≥ P Xr , then let X ← X r . Otherwise, let X ← X l . Go back to Step 1.
Algorithm 4
Let M be a new member . 1) First calculate C * M,X for every node X, and obtain C * min , where C *
For Algorithm 3, the following theorem holds in the same way as Theorem 4 although the proof is more complicated.
Theorem 5
When the key tree constructed by Algorithm 3 is sufficiently large, the average normalized withdrawal cost l of the key tree satisfies that
where K 4 is defined as follows.
Proof: (Omitted) We note from Theorem 5 that the coefficient of H(P) in (32) is also one although the constant terms are larger than (27). This means that Algorithm 3 can also attain asymptotically optimal key tree for the withdrawal cost in addition to decreasing the joining cost.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the previous sections, we showed that Algorithms 1 and 3 are asymptotically optimal and Algorithms 2 and 4 are expected to achieve more efficient performance than Algorithms 1 and 3, respectively, in the case of withdrawal. In this section, we evaluate the performances of Algorithms 1-4 by simulation.
We first construct the optimal tree, i.e., Huffman tree for a group with n members. Then, a new member joins the group each after a member withdraws from the group. Such joining and withdrawal are repeated m times. It is assumed that the withdrawal probability of a new member P M is uniformly distributed in [0.1, 0.9]. For this case, the average costs of joining and withdrawal are shown in Tables I and II,  respectively. We note from the tables that Algorithms 3 and 4 can improve the cost of joining at a little increased cost of withdrawal. Algorithms 2 and 4 are more efficient than Algorithms 1 and 3, respectively, in the case of withdrawal. But the difference is not large, and Algorithms 2 and 4 require O(n) time complexity although Algorithms 1 and 3 can be implemented with O(log n) time complexity. Therefore, Algorithms 3 and 4 should be used in the cases of large n and small n, respectively. If the backward security described in section I is not required for a group, we don't need change any group and subgroup keys when a new member joins the group. Hence, it is preferable to use Algorithms 1 or 2 in such a case.
